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Taking Humanism Seriously:
Science and Rhetoric in the
Postmodern World

Edmund E. Jacobitti

1. THE SCIENTIFIC AND THE RHETORICAL PARADIGM

By the scientific perspective, I mean our traditional logocentric
belief in a discoverable, objective reality existing independent of
the observer. By humanism, I mean a contrary notion, an immanentist orientation that regards fixed compass points, divine
or natural, as but temporary conventions. And by postmodern I
mean "incredulity toward metanarratives," as Lyotard put it. 1 A
humanist orientation could not, in short, exist outside a postmodern world. The only real question today is, can we continue
to exist in a postmodern world? Can Man alone rebuild his city
or must we degenerate into a barbarism where life will be so
solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish, that we shall rejoice that it is
also short? It is an open question; but we are where we are and
must do with what we have.
First, postmodern humanism rejects the equation of reason
with mere "logic." "Logic" is incompatible with a life we now
know to be illogical. A priori theory works only in a world fixed
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by inviolable laws, that is, in a theoretical if not actually imaginary
world. A priori logic is a Euclidean game whose players do not
know it is a game. It works flawlessly only so long as it does not
encounter the a posteriori. The a posteriori, on the other hand,
though tied to reality, depends on the empirical world retaining
its shape long enough for the induced rules to be useful. This
may be true of empirical facts like the color of gold or the boiling
point of water; but is it true of important issues, of political issues?
Likewise, Aufhebung fails for it depends on mere faith, on forgetting
the real world; it depends on not reading the newspapers. Practice,
in the view of Aufhebung, is simply along for the ride. Because of
these liabilities, humanist reason abandons all "logics" that rest
on "predictability" and a fixed idea of the "true." In place of
theory, postmodern humanism puts practice.
Second, we are wary of the idea of the "true" because it inevitably leads to a condemnation of man's own work; and that work
is all we have. The idea of the "true" leads to the idea that to see
"clearly and distinctly" we must set aside our work, our own manmade values ("prejudices," "biases," and other historical debris)
in order to be worthy of a transparent vision of the "true." In other
words, where Descartes despaired that "so long as I gave thought
only to the manners and customs of men, I met with nothing to
reassure me," 2 the postmodern humanist accepts that there is, in
fact, nothing but the "manners and customs of men." The "presuppositionless" posture is a will o' the wisp. We must begin with
what we have and not really make orphans of ourselves.
The dangers, of course, of this relativism, of simply accepting
our local inheritance, are obvious and have been the central problem of philosophy since the ancients. But postmodern humanism
is not a salute to Thrasymachus; it is simply tired of tail-chasing.
Instead of lamenting our eviction from the garden, humanism
proposes that we build our own civitas. Instead of lamenting the
loss of the "true," humanism condemns the effort to purge "bias"
from our souls. Ecrasezl'infame has come to mean eradicating not
only the infamous and the absurd, but all "merely" human values.
In place of courage, honor, the local, we put the "impartial," the
"neutral," and the "objective." We strive to make ourselves valuefree, "moraline free," as Nietzsche said. In short, in our quest for
the "true," we dehumanize ourselves; for every value is subjected
to the reductioadHitleriumby the defenders of" objectivity." Nothing
can be despised-except
not being "objective." "Alas, the time of
the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to
despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man."3 For the "last
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man," any action, any thought, is "bias." Somnambulism masquerades as virtuous "objectivity." In fact, however, it is when
we are free of all our so-called superficial, historical, cultural, etc.,
"biases," that we become morally dead, decadent, unable without
those "biases" to recognize Hitler and Stalin.
"It is my contention," said Nietzsche, "that all the values in
which mankind now sums up its supreme desiderata are decadence
values. ... It is my contention that all the supreme values of mankind ... which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are
lording it under the holiest names." 4 And what are the "holiest
names" if not "objectivity," "tolerance," "neutrality," and so on?
Conservative (and pessimistic) European thinkers like Leo
Strauss, Eric Voegelin, radicals like Georges Sorel, Benedetto
Croce, Hannah Arendt, Russians (a separate category, I guess)
like Solzhenitsyn, Doestoevsky, and countless others 5-whatever
one may make of their solutions-all have pointed an accusing
finger at the futility of trying to wage a moral struggle against totalitarianism from a morally neutral point of view. If knowing the
world requires jumping out of our morality, how are we to act
and judge that world? "For what is a man profitted, if he gain
the whole world, and lose his own soul?"
The value of postmodern humanism is that it rejects objectivity and soporific "logic" and, with these narcotics gone, it opens
the way to a conscious recovery of defensible moral values and a
positive conception of life.
Here I shall argue, first, that such a positive conception may
be made through a recovery of the rhetorical tradition. Second,
that science, far from being a search for the "true," is also a form
of rhetoric. And lastly, that, though the unvarnished truth of the
matter is that all wisdom is rhetorical, rhetoric is not free construction. It is checked by history, the rhetoric of other cultures and
individuals, and, in science, by nature.
The illusion that we can only pursue the "true" if we adopt
a passive and "neutral" point of view has made us blind to rhetoric,
made us see rhetoric as "mere rhetoric," the smoke and fumes
that obscure the "true." If logic has led to decadence, impotence,
and nihilism, then rhetoric, which is wisdom based in the real
world of historical practice, may lead us back to concrete and
practical considerations. On the other hand, a rhetoric checked
by experience and the views of the other may also help us avoid
some of the Neanderthal tendencies of antimodernism. In short,
we will have to walk a fine line between the siren of Modernity
and the primitive.
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By rhetoric, I mean wisdom that is committed rather than
neutral, rooted in flexible common sense rather than in abstract
logosand that unconsciously (or even better, consciously-if that
ever be possible) shapes reality as opposed to merely discovering it.
Rhetoric may operate at two levels. On the one hand, it must
first be rooted in the present situation and common sense. It acts
with purpose and attributes purpose to the actions of others. It
does not seek absolute proof or truth before it acts because it
knows absolute proof is unavailable. At the same time, rhetoric
may also operate at a deeper and more self-conscious level, a level
where we know that truth is created and not discovered.
Science, on the other hand, deals (or purports to deal) with
the fixed, the true, that is, with the merely true-that exceedingly
thin veneer of reality where prediction, order, and rationality
prevail. It tests itself in various forms of "logic." Rhetoric, on the
other hand, rejects the standard of "logic" and the cogito. It tests
itself against the views of others, against tradition, and against a
nature that it both constitutes and discovers. Therefore, we may
say that though there are various theories of rhetoric, 7 all share
one common trait: they are dialogical 8 and welcome the challenge
of give-and-take. They deal with the self and the other, the self
and the world, the self and the past, and the self and the future.
Other standards of reason are not dialogical. A priori reason is
monological and shuts out the other as irrelevant. Inductive ratio
only listens when the other responds logically, predictably, as
modernism (pre-)figured it had the duty to do. Aufhebung, of
course, listens too-but to echoes. That these standards have been
preferred over the dialogical and the rhetorical is testimony to
man's fear of the world and his escapist fascination with games,
acrostics, and a universe ruled by Natural Law.
It is always suspicious, of course, when one rattles an idol
(idyl?) like Newton (or even Einstein); and I am not suggesting that
we reject deterministic science and return to mysticism, magic, and
the occult. Rather, we need to recognize that Newtonian-Einsteinian
physics applies only to one narrow segment of reality-the segment on which we, with our passion for "logic," have concentrated.
The rest of life-a large part of physical as well as social reality-is
not logical. In that illogical part of life, we know no more than we
did before the scientific revolution. Indeed, because we have been
hypnotized by science at the expense of life, we may know less.
It may be useful, therefore, to try to recall pre-scientific wisdom.
One example of such wisdom is the thought of Machiavelli.
Machiavelli emphasized the positive role of man in building civiliza-
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tion and would have been astonished at the idea of applying the
model of nature to the human order of things. In the Discourses,
Machiavelli observed that nature was created by Heaven as the
enemy of man. 9 The use of the word "Heaven" may seem an odd
tum of phrase for an unbeliever, but it is plain, here and elsewhere,
that by "Heaven" Machiavelli simply meant "chance" (caso).10 Caso
is the cause of nature as well as of nature's freakish outbursts of
unruly behavior.
Opposed to the alien and mysterious "order" of nature,
Machiavelli presented the human order of "language and religion. " 11
This was a true order of things, created on purpose by the rhetoric
of men like Moses who, Machiavelli made clear, knew what was
necessary to found an order of things long before he dragged in
God as his spokesman. Casting Moses as the primal deceiver,
Machiavelli thrust the origin of postmodernism back to about 1300
B.C. and separated man not only from nature but from God as well.
The human order is the creation of man; and men are (or at least
men like Machiavelli's Moses are) calculating, purposeful, founders
(ordinatori)of civil order. This order is founded on man-made conventions and its rulers are aided-when necessary-by man-made gods.
Nature, on the other hand, is random, hostile, and the enemy of
order. The idea of a "natural law" was, for Machiavelli, an absurdity,
a contradiction in terms, like "university administration."
Newtonian physics, of course, regards the idea that nature is
ruled by "chance" as a bit of residual mysticism, a historical-cultural
smudge on the transparent window through which we clearheaded
modems can see nature's mindless machinery . Modems who worship at the shrine of an orderly nature are apt, therefore, to find a
quaint mysticism, if not a certain craziness, in a view that thinks
nature acts spontaneously and by "chance ." The "scientific" model,
in short, has become the only acceptable model for knowledge of
any kind; and thinkers who doubted its sanctity were, by the
eighteenth century, regarded as reactionary curiosities.
One of these curiosities was Giambattista Vico, who dismissed
the scientific model as pure mysticism and astonished his readers
by announcing that man could more easily come to know civil
society than nature. To know a thing, Vico said, had nothing to
do with measuring the thing. F = (g)M 1M 2/d 2 does not tell us what
gravity is (who could know that?); it simply measures the ratio of
forces between M 1 and M 2 . To accept mere measurement as knowledge was to settle for a cheap imitation of knowledge. The only
way to know a thing is to have made it. We can never, for example,
have the kind of knowledge of DNA that we have of computers
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because we did not make DNA and do not even know why it
was made. Man, however, did make the rules of society and the
world of nations and so can come to know these things :
Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers
should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of
nature, which , since God made it, He alone knows; and that they
should have neglected the study of the world of nations or civil
world, which, since men had made it, men could come to know. 12

There, in one extraordinary (if unnoticed) sentence, Vico
swept away the whole vision of an orderly universe patrolled by
a rational God and ordered by a natural law. With the rejection
of natural and divine law came as well the rejection of both divineright monarchy and the so-called social contract, that primordial
powwow of fully conscious neanderthals who supposedly met,
discovered the social corollaries of the laws of nature, and then
wrote out a meum and tuum with their "elected" sovereign.
In fact, said Vico, man did not discover the natural law; he
"made" it, created it with his own language and rhetoric; and did so
without divine or natural guidance. Then, however, overwhelmed
with the majesty of his creation (and subdued by religion and
philosophy), he came to believe that the natural law must have been
communicated to him by God-or at least by a philosopher.
Like Machiavelli, Vico saw nature as something unknowable,
alien to man. Long before Darwin, Italian rhetors and many others
had seen that life in the state of nature, life beforeman took charge,
was simply survival of the fittest. "At the beginning of the world,"
said Machiavelli, "the inhabitants were few in number and lived for
a time dispersed like beasts ." Likewise, Vico noted that the first
men were "wild and savage ." And even earlier, ancients like Cicero
had pointed out that, before the appearance of the rhetor, men
"wandered at large in the fields like animals. " 13
The question for Machiavelli, Vico, Cicero, and the ancient
Italians was not how to recover the law of nature-but how to escape
it. According to these thinkers, men escaped the jungle through
their pragmatic common sense and rhetoric. Rhetoric, common
sense, was practical wisdom worked out in the world and not, like
the cogito,wisdom imposed on the world. It was, moreover, common
sense, not individual and isolated knowledge; and because it
was common,it was tested in the world, against the wisdom of others.
The appearance of so many Italians in this roster of thinkers
opposing the new scientific model is not coincidental. From ancient
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times, the Romans had turned not to Socrates and abstract
rationalism, but to Aristophanes, to rhetorical and historical contexts, to the perspective of practice and ordinary language. Thus,
Cicero, scorning abstract issues of purely metaphysical irrelevance, noted, against the idea of philosopher-kings and founders,
that "orators were originally the founders and often the saviors
of states." Moreover, where philosophy was of use to the few,
oratory and rhetoric were written in the language of the many:
Whereas in all other arts the highest excellence is found in that
which is farthest from the intelligence and appreciation of the unlearned, in oratory, it is a great fault to be out of harmony with
the language of every-day life, and the accepted usage of men of
ordinary taste and intelligence [consuetudine communis sensus]. 14

Romans, in short, were not worried about metaphysics; they worried about how to govern a republic and then an empire of citizens
-in this world .
Immune to the theoretical siren, Roman thought remained
worldly, practical, and rhetorical; Machiavelli in the Renaissance
and Vico in the eighteenth century represented attempts to reassert
that tradition against the dominant rationalist view. Likewise, in
the second half of the nineteenth century and especially in the finde-sieclerevolt against the old Newtonian science, the old humanist
rhetorical perspective appeared in thinkers like Francesco De
Sanctis, Benedetto Croce, Antonio Labriola, Antonio Gramsci,
and others. Rejecting both Roman Catholic culture with its transcendent God and scientific culture with its transcendent nature,
these thinkers argued that the course of history was entirely up
to man. Belief in the Newtonian model was a seductive fantasy
that led men away from their proper work. Thus Croce, for example, embodying, of course, all the fury of the fin-de-sieclerevolt
against science-but also, by now, a tradition-observed
that scientists would have to be put in their place if man was to see his
true place in the maelstrom and act responsibly .15
The science of nature, said Croce, was a mere "pseudo-con cept." Man could no more know nature than he could know the
future. Science was not, Croce said-with Kuhnian precision-the
objective study of a necessary or fixed nature, but an arbitrary, if
not exactly capricious, decision to arrange and study natural things
in a particular way favored by particular disciplines. Arranging
them so, scientists found such-and-such to be the "natural" relationship . But, had they arranged things differently, they would
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have found another relationship to be the "natural" one.
Long before Jorge Luis Borges rocked Michel Foucault back
on his heels with his hilariously terrifying taxonomy taken from
a "certain Chinese encyclopedia," 16 Croce had seen the effrontery
of a taxonomy that claimed to be "value free." Croce said that
taxonomists, like all scientists, "choose" the way they see nature:
To be able to choosethis or that particular division (the organs of
nutrition, or reproduction, etc., or this or that particular part of
the organs or functions) is precisely the arbitrary element and hence
the extraneous [element] that is introduced. 17

To mention Borges, of course, is quite enough to make one
wonder if anything but an arbitrary science riddled with choice
is possible. Borges's bizarre characters not only do not think in
our universals but, to avoid leaps of faith, do not think in universals
at all. "The meta physicians of Tkm," says Borges, "do not seek for
truth or even verisimilitude, but rather for the astounding" -but
who knows, today, what is astounding? 18
To mention the nearly blind Argentinian librarian Borges and
his world also recalls for us the character of the nearly blind librarian
Jorge di Burgos in Umberto Eco's Name of the Rose, that amazing
Saussurian "labrinth," at the end of which the detective finds, by
accident-by false reason-the
murderer. By that accidental discovery, Eco raises again today the question of the Italian rhetors
as to the method of the "true." Who knows, asks Adso at the end
of the "labrinth," if all thought is not but a "cento, a figured hymn,
an immense acrostic that says and repeats nothing?" 19
It is, of course, the issue raised repeatedly by Eco and others
today. In his "Looking for a Logic of Culture," for example, Eco
issues an ironic warning to "forget the objects of discourse" because "signs are not entities but relations; they stand for something
else, but the problem of meaning does not concern the 'they' or
the 'something' but the function 'standing for."' 20
The suspicion that nature lies outside any logic is, of course,
an idea that is now widely believed by linguists and even
philosopher-scientists like Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and
Ilya Prigogine; but it was raised by Italian rhetors long before
Saussure made language a system of difference rather than identity or before Martin Heidegger and later Jacques Derrida made
reason into tail-chasing exhibitionism.
Eco's Burgos is interesting, however, not only because he at
least indicates that the world is there even if we find it only by
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accident. He is interesting also because he destroyed the only
copy of the "lost" sections of Aristotle's poetics, the sections on
comedy. Why comedy? Partly, no doubt, because, as Burgos said,
laughter before the divinely fixed order was inappropriate, but
more to the point, because comedy, even before Aristophanes
spoofed Socrates, represented the antidote to the fixed "true" of
philosophy and science. Comedy raised against Socrates' constant, exasperating, and tail-chasing inquiry, the concrete and
rhetorical wisdom of common sense and the ars topica,and, asked
Socrates if he knew where his science, his philosophy was
grounded. 21
Such ideas, stretching back to the ancients and on through
Machiavelli, Vico, Croce, Eco, and half a dozen others, barely
scratch the surface of rhetoric's long opposition to fixed Socratic
ratio. We should not, however, confuse this rhetorical rejection
of objectivity with the modern ironic rejection of all norms and
structures . Unlike so many modern intellectual muggers and sappers, one finds in the tradition of the ancients and in the Italian
tradition (Croce , perhaps, excepted) a belief that not only was
something being knocked down, but something was also being
built up. Much of today's archaeological digging seems-whatever
its late founder may have had in mind-to be simply entertainment, "you dig, man?"
Italian rhetorical thought aimed, on the other hand, at a
knowledge deeper than either superficial modernist and Newtonian theory or mere present common sense. It aimed at founding
a pragmatic wisdom that harmonized the claims of the past with
those of the present, the claims of the many with those of the
few. It aimed at allowing a people to act and judge; and so it
aimed to redeem them from the charlatans who demand "proof"
and denounce all that cannot be "proven," all that is not universal,
necessary, and eternal. Rhetoric is not, in short, a text to be tested
against "proof" but against other "common senses," past and
present. A rhetorical text must test itself in a dialogue with those
that opposeit. A serious
text is a network of resistances, and a dialogue is a two-way affair;
a good reader is also an attentive and patient listener. Questions
are necessary to focus interest in an investigation, but a fact may be
pertinent to a frame of reference by contesting or even contradicting
it. An interest in what does not fit a model and an openness to
what one does not expect to hear from the past may even help to
transform the very questions one poses to the past . Both the purely
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documentary and the "presentist" extremes are "monological" insofar as they deny these possibilities. 22

Recent events in physical science indicate that this dialogical
method is also gaining adherents in the hard sciences and that
the old scientific method of "proof" is losing ground. These events
are promising because they make a shambles of the nai:ve idea
that nature is mindless machinery, that science is knowledge of
the "true," and that the scientific method is the only method for
gaining wisdom. I do not refer simply to the suspicions about
scientific paradigms that Thomas Kuhn used to unsettle physical
and social scientists-and
finally himself 23-but to events within
physics itself.
These events establish at least two things. First, nature is
ruled in large part by unknowable forces that do not submit to
logic or laws; and second, that the revered scientific method is
useful only in a thin veneer of the physical universe.
Because of these two remarkable changes, we shall see that
nature can only be understood as an independent force with whom
we are in a perpetual dialogue. Dialogue, moreover, is the proper
model for all learning-for learning about other cultures, other
peoples, the past and the present, and also about nature .
The key to real dialogue lies in the recognition that the other
can never be completely known or mastered. Dialogue is a mutual
probing. Modernity, on the other hand, regards nature as simply
complex machinery, an unlimited source of plunder and a fixed
standard of the "true." Cutting ourselves loose from this absolute
standard should allow man to see his real place; and, at the same
time, make him appreciate nature as an independent force to be
respected rather than mastered. This is not a return to mysticism;
but a middle ground between the blind adherents of "progress"
and some postmodern Luddites who are always ready to circle
the wagons and head on back to the Middle Ages.
2. PHYSICS IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF MODERNISM

Whoever is not shocked by quantum physics has not understood it.Niels Bohr

In his 1913 papers, Niels Bohr established the paradigm for
modern quantum mechanics. These papers show the influence of
Harald H0ffding (1843-1931), professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen and (after Kierkegaard) the most prominent
modern Danish philosopher. H0ffding had been a friend of the
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Bohr family and Niels' philosophy professor at Copenhagen. 24
H0ffding had some remarkable insights. He had rejected the
Christian implications of Kierkegaard's philosophy; but he had
absorbed enough existential Angst to see that this world could
never be explained by a merely rational mind. Seeing three conflicting sets of ideas-Kierkegaard's
"fear and trembling"; Kant's
(mostly) unknowable "things-in-themselves"; and the partial insights of Auguste Comte's mathematical positivism-H0ffding
concluded that reality must not be laid out in a single plane.
Rather, it was a series of complementary but mutually exclusive
dimensions. The archaethat lay at the very basis of reality could
be seen in different ways-but no one way exhausted the nature
of the archaeor excluded other perspectives.
This idea made a great impact on Bohr 25 and appeared in his
theory of quantum mechanics as the "principle of complementarity" -the idea that the electromagnetic spectrum may, incomprehensibly, manifest itself as either waves or particles. The dual
nature of matter is not easily accepted for it implies that the world
is not a one-dimensional Newtonian "true" but a multidimensional
Pirandellian world that no single system of thought can grasp.
Moreover, the very idea of a universe of discrete particles (or
so-called "wavicles") contradicted the long-established idea of a
continuous universe ruled by deterministic "absolute" laws. It
inevitably meant that at least some particles would be disobedient
and, therefore, that the laws of thermodynamics were not absolute
but probable. Indeed, Planck, who discovered the particulate or
discrete nature of heat, was so unnerved by the discovery that
he spent the rest of his life trying to prove himself wrong.
Second, Bohr noted that, in investigating the behavior of particles, one had to make choices. 26 We can, for example, measure
the position or the momentum of a particle but not both. One
had, in other words, as Croce was then saying, to choose.
Bohr's work on the nature of matter also led him to another
unnerving conclusion. Observation could not be objective. This
was over and beyond Einstein's principle of relativity. It meant
that not only was there no privileged, objective position, but that
man actually altered "the true" or nature when he observed it. In
fact, he could not see nature without altering it. With this conclusion and those of others later on, the idea of a nature or "true"
independent of the observer utterly broke down. 27 In short, as in
a dialogue with a human, the answers we get when we interrogate
nature depend on the questions we ask; and it is through these
questions and answers that we construct (a) reality. This idea
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today is called the "anthropic principle" and, according to physicist John Wheeler, shows that man plays an active and never a
neutral role in the observation/construction of nature. 28
We could, however, also call an anthropic principle the rhetorical principle. Nature, like social reality, is a product of rhetoric
or the discursive patterns established by the scientist. Reality,
therefore, has many dimensions and the one we examine is not
only at the expense of others, but depends on our questions. Nature
is not objectively "discovered." It changes its shape and responds
differently depending on what we ask. To all of us who were
taught that nature was a mere machine, this anthropic principle
is shocking. "Is it," asked Banesh Hoffman back in 1947, "too
much to swallow? Is it incredible? Is it against common sense?" 29
Humans alter their behavior when they are observed, but
why should a machine behave differently simply because someone
watches it? Is there a way to access reality "objectively," transparently? The common-sense answer is, of course, that later on, with
more sophisticated methods, we will discover the hidden variable
and reach the "true." Experiment, however, confirms that there
is no hidden variable. 30 By constructing one set of measures, one
physical reality, we occult others that are-or could have beenequally real. For instance, in order to examine a cell, biologists
had for years stained the cell to set it apart from the others that
surrounded it. It is the only way to see the cell. But is the stained
cell any longer the "real" cell? How could the real cell, the "true
cell," ever be seen? In short, observation, by its very nature,
distorts. In fact, the idea of creating/obscuring the "true" nature of
things in order to see at all was, as Kierkegaard and Pascal saw-to
say nothing of Machiavelli or Gorgias-hardly new. It was simply
swept under the rug until the birth of quantum mechanics.
If scientists had ignored these considerations in the past, the
anthropic principle in quantum physics was too dramatic to ignore. Particles, are so delicate that an electromagnetic wave strong
enough to make them visible not only alters them, for example,
it destroys them. Now the scientist has a "choice" of either not
seeing the particle at all or of destroying it. The result is that a
particle's position has to be accepted on faith and its behavior
calculated through the laws of probability. A "real" particle ceases
to be the objective discrete entity or "true" pictured in classical
physics and becomes a cloud smeared around a particular locus
with a shape dependent on the measure employed . The idea
seemed bizarre and impossible. After all, nature had been, since
the 1687 Principia, the standard. What right had it to be merely
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probable?This led Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) to his famous
indeterminacy principle: the more we establish a particle's position, the less we know of its momentum.
Thus, in addition to the principle of complementarity and
Wheeler's anthropic principle, Bohr's ideas also meant that (high
energy) physics was no longer an absolute science of the true,
but a "science" of the probable behavior of particles. Absolute
laws in physics prevailed only in the Newtonian dimension .31
It is interesting, to say the least of it, to note that the collapse
in the belief in an absolute Newtonian science of the "true" broke
down in physics in the wake of challenges to an absolute science
of the "true" in social theory. That is, after the appearance of
thinkers like Nietzsche, Sorel, Croce, Bergson, and so on; after
the "discovery" of Kierkegaard and Pascal; and, somewhat later,
with the appearance of Martin Heidegger, there came a new generation of physicists (Bohr, Born, Dirac, Schrodinger, Heisenberg,
etc.) who doubted an absolute true in nature. In short, the shattering of the God-given physical world and the God-given social
world occurred at approximately the same time.
Then a remarkable thing took place. Physicists, earlier unnerved by the introduction of probability and particles into
physics, began to see in probability a restoration of the "true."
They began, in fact, to accept quantum mechanics only when they
saw that probability theory was not a complete and unfathomable
randomness or what is today called, with superb (if oxymoronic)
precision, "chaos theory." Probability represented, in short, at
least an approximate order to things; it allowed one to ignore the
random and the novel. Probability allowed one to whistle in the
dark. Even with probability, however, many-including Einsteinwould not accept the new quantum mechanics. Probability was
not precise enough for him . Einstein's God (or was it Einstein
himself?) did not play dice.
With as much fear of chance as Aristotle, physicists like
Heisenberg and Schrodinger set about taming randomness
through probability theory. And soon a comprehensible order, a
familiar and comforting order, the logos, emerged again in the
statistical, if occasionally untidy, behavior of particles . Given a
large enough sample of particles, an order could be discerned.
Certainly, at the macroscopic level, at the level of living systems,
we ought, therefore,to be able to ignore randomness. In fact, the
tremendous number of particles even in microscopic systems
seemed to allow randomness to be swept under the rug. Newtonianism was put on the back burner as physicists then turned
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to probability theory in order to explore the inside of the atom.
Moreover, probability served the interests of social scientists,
anxious to escape iron determinism and yet hungry for the merger
of social and physical theory, hungry for the respectaccorded the
particle physicist. The belief,in short, that science was a discipline
checked by hard nature and confirmed in the esoteric mathematics
of probability, matrices, wave mechanics, frequency distribution,
and so on, led nearly everyone in and out of science to hold
science up as the epistemological model of truth. Articles in journals like the American Political ScienceReview began to look like
articles in the American Journalof Physics. In the late 1950s and in
the 1960s, social theories (behaviorist, structuralist, functionalist,
etc.) began to require knowledge of statistics, matrices, and probability. The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan
and various behavioralist thinkers began the search for what David
Easton, one of the champions of the new social science, called a
"broad gauge theory" that would, like a unified field theory, tie
all human behavior together. 32
Then came 1968 and the emergence in social theory of poststructuralism. Rigidity, "norms," structures, began to appear as
oppressive, tyrannical, "Gaullist." Ideas challenging order, even
probable and arbitrary order, hitherto in the wings, took center
stage. Physicists, too, began to wonder if there were not other
dimensions beneath the probable and the deterministic. Thomas
Kuhn's The Structure of ScientificRevolutionssuddenly skyrocketed
into prominence. Where Bohr and the quantum physicists had
raised questions about the stability and, therefore, the knowability
of nature, Kuhn raised questions about the stability of the knower,
suggesting that his science was culture-bound. Indeed, because
of his imprisonment in a particular culture, the scientist could
only challenge his hypotheses from within that same paradigm.
A really serious test would require the perspective of an "alien."
For example, Andrew Pickering, a physicist from the Bohr Institute
in Copenhagen and now a researcher in elementary particle
physics at the University of Edinburgh, noted that "in the 1960s
and 1970s constellations of neutrino experiment weak-interaction
theory were incommensurable : the old and new theory of the
weak-interaction were each confirmed in its own phenomenal
domain and were each disconfirmed outside it." From this he
concluded that "to listen too closely to scientists may be simrly
to stifle the imagination. World views are cultural products." 3
Kuhn's work shook the scientific community. Its implications
were so explosive that it became required reading in virtually every
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field, and so lent fuel to the growing revolt against the "true."
While Kuhn raised questions about the ability of the scientist
to develop and test theories that transcend culture, others went
further and began to wonder if scientists had ever really bothered
to seriously test their theories. Perhaps the theories were, like
Adso's acrostic, mere language games. Perhaps probability had
only been a desperate attempt to "save the appearances," the
vestiges of the "logos." Scientific theory began to lose its luster.
The suspicion began to grow that scientists did not aim at finding
theories to explain reality, but at protecting their theories against
probes by marauding enemy facts. Thus, the physicist-philosopher
Paul Feyerabend noted in 1975 of "Von Neumann's work in quantum mechanics," that the theory has become "a veritable monster
of rigour and precision while its relation to experience is more
obscure than ever." 34 Indeed, in Feyerabend's opinion, "no single
theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. " 35 In
short, a theory, as Feyerabend loves to point out, is simply testimony to the scientist's ability to exclude counterexamples.
While Feyerabend and Kuhn challenged the idea that science
was getting closer to the "true," others took a different and more
dramatic course. Physicists like Ilya Prigogine and Mitchell Feigenbaum, meteorologist Edward Lorenz, astronomer Michel Henon,
biologist Robert May, mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, and
others, began to argue that reality is not one thing, but a series
of local "realities" -each ruled by a different "ruler" or" attractor."
Deterministic classical physics and even probabilistic quantum
mechanics examined only two narrow loci of reality, loci where
systems were rather law-abiding. Beyond these areas, however,
were other loci inhabited by large numbers of outlaws and desperadoes. Prigogine and the others, in short, introduced the next
revolution in physics: examination of that vast reality beneath the
veneer of order on which physics has concentrated since the seventeenth century. It is a physical reality that moderns find repugnant,
more compatible with Machiavelli's or Vico's theory of nature
than Einstein's.
The science of this disorderly world is one that, since the late
1970s, has mushroomed into prominence as scientists have more
and more come to realize that what characterizes our world is not
order, regularity, and periodicity, but disorder and noise-in
short, chaos.
To enter the world of chaos theory (Lasciateogni speranza)is to
involve oneself in the world of nonlinear equations, of Feigenbaum
sequences, Lyapunov exponents, bifurcation points, "strange at-
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tractors," feedback loops, multidimensional driven dissipative
systems, and other esoteric if not absolutely metamagical notions.
Studying chaos is not like studying the artificially organized
laboratory experiments of traditional physics. Pioneers in this
spooky land are apt instead to uncover things which are closer
to the supernatural and Kafkaesque than the natural. Thus,
Feigenbaum discovered a universal scaling constant in periodic
bifurcation points, and Lorenz shattered Von Neumann's dream
of weather prediction by demonstrating how the slightest changes
in the parameters of iterated equations could produce dazzlingly
unforeseen events. Michel Henon, departing from traditional and
tedious recording of periodic astronomical orbits, began tracking
down intergalactic "strange attractors" that produced complete
disorder as well as order. Robert May revolutionized the study of
ecology by showing that theories of periodicity in animal reproduction completely missed far more important and chaotic demographics; Mandelbrot discovered that scaling could be a key to
certain types of chaos; and Prigogine explored the real meaning
of the second law of thermodynamics-and
won the Nobel Prize
for it in 1977.
Chaos theory is complex; but the heart of it lies in its assumption that from the big bang on, the world has been in disequilibrium.
This emphasis on nonequilibrium or far-from-equilibrium studies
separates chaos theory from classical physics and traditional quantum mechanical physics; for both of these assume equilibria to be
the norm. In nonequilibrium systems, the participants in the system either never settle down or move randomly between one
equilibrium and any number of others.
This assumption of disequilibrium is warranted by the fact
that an orderly, homogeneous, or isotropic universe is clearly not
what we find around us. Indeed, an orderly and predictable universe would be most astonishing: galactic matter would, as the
old cosmological principle used to hold, be evenly distributed
rather than appearing in the uneven bubbles we see; weather
would be absolutely predictable; chemical systems, instead of taking off with a life of their own, would never saltate-and
consequently evolution would not have taken place; dynamic systems
like flowing water would run smoothly no matter how high the
pressure; laboratory experiments would not require a fudge factor
because life and the laboratory would be indistinguishable; systems would run forever rather than obeying the second law of
thermodynamics and running down; matter and anti-matter
would be equally distributed and would annihilate each other
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(and us), and so on. In fact, as common sense (as opposed to
science) has always held, what is most obvious about the physical
world is how little of it is well-behaved; it is not like a clock. In
other words, out-of-the-laboratory physics, like life, is about as
predictable as picking the right line at the supermarket. The key
question for physics is, therefore, not what events are regular, but
what makes the world irregular and familiar. The answer is that
the system is not in equilibrium.
Concentrating on this lack of equilibrium in the universe,
chaos theory reverses the ideas of Newton, Einstein, Bohr, et al.,
so that instead of factoring out the background noise (subsidiary
fluctuations, static, etc.) in order to hear the periodic and regular
functions, we factor out periodicity in order to hear the noise.
The assumption here is that the noise is the voice of the underlying
disequilibrium. It is precisely the noise, therefore, that is significant, for it carries the "genetic code" of the universe. Not only
does the noise of disequilibrium constantly feed back into the
system and make the real world different from the laboratory, but
it is the fact of disequilibrium that makes the world so vulnerable
to minor events. Because the system is running constantly on tilt,
it can react violently and unpredictably to the slightest additional
input. Minor and random events, therefore, can produce disproportional or nonlinear consequences . The classic and not altogether frivolous metaphor is that of a butterfly flapping its wings
in China and producing a cyclone in Kansas . Such a jolting idea,
of course, makes evident the impossibility of prediction. More
important, however, it points up the futility of traditional scientific
or reductionist procedures that aim at the isolation of "real" (i.e.,
"periodic")
events
from the irregular,
"unreal"
background noise of the flapping wings. It is precisely the "epiphenomenal" noise of the flapping wings that burbles up through the
system and then produces the important and dramatic result. In
short, by concentrating on the periodic, we have found what we
were looking for; but we have been looking for the wrong thing.
One of the most important chaos theorists is Ilya Prigogine,
who has concentrated on issues in far-from-equilibrium situations
where nonlinear and random relationships are the rule. Such relations, as we have seen, have traditionally been ignored by classical and quantum mechanical physics because they were assumed
to be simply part of the noise. Moreover, they involve devilishly
difficult if not impossible nonlinear equations, equations in effect
for what burbles up through the system as opposed to what is tidy
and periodic. As physics moves out of the laboratory, however,

DIFFERENT/A

108

equations like this become necessary because the disequilibrium
magnifies minor events in nonlinear and startling ways.
In organic chemical processes, for example, as opposed to
mechanical systems, almost anything can happen because chemical enzymes can engage in autocatalytic or cross-catalytic relationships and produce whole new systems-which
can, in turn, go
on and produce new systems themselves. By a process of saltation,
one can, therefore, move quickly and randomly away from the
given starting point. In demographics and many systems in
physics where the solution to the unknown variable is fed back
into the equation the next time it is run, the feedback loops can
also produce exceptionally dramatic results. As Prigogine put it,
in this area, "there is no longer any universally valid law from
which the overall behavior of the system can be determined. Each
system is a separate case. " 36
Prigogine is especially interested in disequilibrium and in the
study of the uncanny outburst of patterned order that one occasionally finds in the midst of chaos. He has concentrated on dissipative structures, the near-magical appearance of chemical
"clocks," Benard instability, and other fugitive systems that classical and quantum mechanical physics would like to forget. Such
phenomena concern bifurcation points or points beyond which,
because of disequilibrium, it is impossible to predict even the
probable course a system will take. This is the domain of the
chaotic where both deterministic and probabilistic theory break
down. It is the domain of eerie half-real phenomena known as
"strange attractors," which are thought to produce or provoke
some of the astonishing patterns that appear in and "limit" the
chaos.
These chaotic and astonishing events mean that beneath the
order revealed in classical and quantum physics there are vast
areas of nature that know no law at all. Benard instability, because
it is merely mechanical, is a less complex example of this kind of
freakish phenomenon. But it is illustrative. Benard instability describes a liquid system that, by increased linear inputs of energy, is
driven from stability to instability. By rights, the system should collapse. However, in defiance of the second law of thermodynamics-which states that disorder can never decrease-the
system
suddenly rights itself through convection and emerges as a new
and more orderly system-more
orderly than the initial system
was to begin with . In short, increased entropy is used for, or at
any rate accompanied by, the spontaneous emergence of a more
organized system! We can understand how systems, following
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the second law, become old, wear out, and fall apart. What, however, are we to make of a system that "falls" from equilibrium into
chaos and then into something more tightly organized than it was
originally? It is the equivalent of a landfill suddenly reassembling
itself as a Mercedes-Benz. It indicates something completely unexpected: nature can right itself, can act spontaneously on its own.
This is not an isolated example but one of many. It is, as Prigogine
asserts, but" another striking example of the instability of a stationary state giving rise to a phenomenon of spontaneous self-organization."37
Our inclination, of course, when faced with something like
"spontaneous self-organization" in nature, is utter amazement.
What is out there? This is a tremendously eerie and disturbing
event. The idea that nature can spontaneously compose and recompose itself at will is utter nonsense in classical and quantum
physics. It means that we have been on a false scent in restricting
our physics to the orderly, the "true"; and it is, in that sense, a
shattering experience.
It does not, however, mean that chaos theory is the only
game in town. It means, rather, that though there is a single
universe, it has many dimensions, one of which operates according
to the laws of determinism, another which obeys probability
theory, and beneath this rational surface, still another and greater
part that fluctuates chaotically between various and unpredictable
states.
Moreover, it means that there are times when chaos enters
and affects systems in equilibrium so that even there no single
theory can ever comprehend the whole. In Prigogine's words,
modern science, or postmodern science, indicates that there is no
fundamental mode of description [for nature]; each level of description is implied by another and implies the other. We need a multiplicity of levels that are all connected, none of which may have a
claim to preeminence. 38

We can see that the nature of physics is now radically altered.
There are reasons, good reasons, to doubt the ability of the scientist
to transcend his cultural paradigm (Kuhn and Pickering), the ability of a theory to ever contain all the facts (Feyerabend), the stability of nature (Bohr), the universality of nature's laws (Prigogine);
and there is convincing evidence that nature can, within limits
established by an attractor, compose itself at will. Physics may,
in short, no longer be conceived as simply filling in blanks in a
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well-known machine. Nature acts spontaneously and chaotically.
Indeed, it is the spontaneous random noise that makes our world
familiarly non-mechanical. As Machiavelli had seen earlier, one
of nature's fundamental characteristics is precisely caso. "Classical
determinism," said Prigogine, "is breaking down." This is not,
moreover, true simply of isolated exceptions or microscopic
curiosities. Randomness is not the exception; order is. Prigogine
noted that
[Randomness] was believed to be of no importance for the description of macroscopic objects such as living systems. But the role of
fluctuations in nonequilibrium systems shows that this is not the
case. Randomness remains essential on the macroscopic level as
well. 39

As Alvin Toffler put it in introducing Prigogine's Order Out of
Chaos, "the old universal laws are not universal at all, but apply
to local regions of reality. " 40
The radical nature of this hypothesis is not easy to exaggerate.
The central role of randomness in macroscopic physics means not
only that universal laws must be replaced by local laws, but that
in these local areas nature may alter its behavior spontaneously.
This is a much more shattering conclusion than Kuhn's view that
the scientist might be culture-bound.
This emphasis on "local rule," of course, reminds one of JeanFrarn;:ois Lyotard's parallel observations in social theory that all
the metanarratives have broken down. Why should the method
of science, which is but a metanarrative, be any different? The
"society of the future," says Lyotard, "falls less within the province
of a Newtonian anthropology ... than a pragmatics of language
particles. There are many different language games-a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches-

localdeterminism."41
In short, patches of local order are all that exist. We have
been using, in our social and scientific models, a model of nature
that is local and not, as we thought, universal, eternal, and necessary. The whole model of knowledge that has been built on the
dream of objective and disinterested observation of "reality" now
turns out to be, as Carl Becker said years ago, a "heavenly city"
erected in place of Augustine's civitas dei by men in desperate
search for certainty. The Newtonian and quantum mechanical
systems do not explain everything. As Lyotard (a bit hyperbolically) concludes,
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systems theory and the kind of legitimation it proposes have no
scientific basis whatsoever; science itself does not function according to this theory's paradigm of the system and contemporary
science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe
society. 42

Postmodern physics, in short, leads us to an appreciation of
nature's novelty, diversity. It puts the concept of immutable universal natural laws in second place as isolated examples.
Both at the macroscopic and microscopic levels, the natural sciences
have ... rid themselves of a conception of objective reality that
implied that novelty and diversity had to be denied in the name
of immutable universal laws. They have rid themselves of a fascination with a rationality taken as closed and a knowledge seen as
nearly achieved . They are now open to the unexpected, which they
no longer define as the result of imperfect knowledge or insufficient
control. 43

This appreciation of the particular and unique at the expense
of the universal and theoretical reminds us of Kant's (and Croce's)
distinction between poetry and prose, the aesthetic judgment and
the philosophical judgment. If prose (the language of philosophy
and traditional science) is concerned with universals (laws and
theories), then poetry or the aesthetic is concerned with the individual, where-as
Prigogine put it-"each system is a special
case." In short, we are led to a convergence of poetics and (postmodern) physics.
In the aesthetic, we have no rules given in reason or practice
for sorting things out. Instead, we must resort to imagination and
ingenuity, two faculties once highly regarded, but shelved in the
scientific revolution in favor of "conceptual thinking." (Descartes'
Rule III, for example, speaks of the "blundering constructions of
imagination .") But, imagination deserves reconsideration; for conceptual thinking applies only in areas that are logical and, as we
have seen, even in physics, such areas are limited to surface dimensions. Imagination reigns in cosmology, chaos theory, high
energy physics, microbiology, organic chemistry, and other areas
where the spontaneous is encountered. By recognizing the large
role that imagination plays in science, we may learn to overcome
the shame we have been taught to feel when we admitted that
unquantifiable imaginative thought is the central feature of practical social and political life, artistic creation, judgment, and so
on. In short, the scientist studying phenomena like bifurcation
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points is in about the same position as everyone else facing a
unique situation, that is, when facing life: he must rely on his
ingenuity. We are, therefore, brought back to Croce's conclusion
that science is not ordained, but a matter of choice. Science does
not have a privileged access to the "true."

3. THE RHETORICAL MODEL

To be in a world where knowledge is local and the knower
is culturally localized, where the particular is the normal and the
universal the exception, is to be in the world the rhetor considers
normal. The rhetor knows that the true model for learning is the
model of the orator and the auditor-each
with different views
and neither having anything to stand on other than his local
insurance. Learning, the model for knowledge, comes from a
recognition of mutual locality . It leads to the making of arguments,
to a dialogue; and it is from this dialogue that "truth"-agreement-is "made." The making of arguments and, therefore, of
the true, is a product of ingenio.
lngenio, according to Cicero and others, was the hallmark of
the rhetor who was skilled in making auditors see extraordinary
meanings in their ordinary language. The orator was skilled in
using creative tropes of speech to open doors closed by habit. The
orator, in short, had to learn to use his opponent's local language,
his common places (loci communes), in order to lead him, to convince him. Only by being aware of the other's language, the other's
local culture, could he inspire and lead him to new and noble
ends, for men must be led from where they actually are to where
they could be. The philosopher, by contrast, is gifted only in the
rarefied language of the few, of knowing where men should be,
as opposed to where they are. The philosopher, therefore, can
see but not lead.
To put the rhetor in this light is to see that he is a poet; for
the original meaning of poiesiswas "making" or "creating." Postmodern humanism is also a kind of poiesisfor it requires a poetic
willingness to venture beyond the theoretical world of the immutable and the logical and into the world of diversity, into the real
world. It requires venturing from where one thinks one is, to
where one really is and always has been. The idea of absolute
laws is as flimsy as the idea of a presuppositionless posture.
Everyone, humanist and scientist, must "make" judgments,
"create" systems, and test himself in a world where logic works
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only rarely. This deconstruction of the border between art and
science, art and criticism, however, need not lead us into a world
without any connections, into Borges' land of Tlon, or Croce's
fantastic a priori a posteriori.
We are led instead into a world held together by man's rhetorical patterns. Prigogine and the chaos theorists have already accepted this. They have transformed science into a form of rhetoric,
a dialogue with a nature we can never master, a nature which is
self-regulating and yet spontaneous and random. Large elements
of it, in fact, act as if they were "alive." This means something
extraordinary; it means, as Prigogine puts it, that because "the
natural contains essential elements of randomness," we can no
longer see matter as "the passive substance described in the mechanistic world view." Rather, it is "associated with spontaneous
activity. This change is so profound that . . . we can really speak
about a new dialogue of man with nature." 44
This is not mysticism; and it means, Prigogine asserts in remarkably Vichian words, that we must make "a poetical interrogation of nature, in the etymological sense that the poet is a
'maker'-active,
manipulating, and exploring." 45 In other words,
we shall have to abandon the Cartesian method that requires us
to decontextualize events and reduce them to their smallest components. To abstract is to distort. Likewise, we shall, at this level
anyway, have to abandon theoretical or conceptual thinking.
This does not mean that we should return to the occult or
turn to oracles. If, as Frederic Jameson put it, "postmodernism
certainly means a return of all the antimodern prejudices," 46 it
offers no succour either to those who long for the pilgrimage to
Stonehenge or for those who love the absurd. The hope of postmodernism is that it can regain control of technology, not erase
it; that it can, precisely, escape the absurd and allow for a
reemergence of humanism. Postmodern humanism's exposure of
science as not a piecemeal discovery of the "true" but a dialogue
with, and an acceptance of, the reality of nature, aims at restoring
to man an ability to assert himself again, if not as an omnipotent
despot, at least as an equal partner.
Nature and society both emerge as partial human constructs.
From this, we may regain some appreciation for our work. History
and nature may be regarded as a medieval stain glass window or
the facade of a Gothic cathedral, complex texts filled with allegories, symbols, and signs-anything
but an uncomplicated
machine with a single meaning. Moreover, like the church or stain
glass, the author may be seen as man inspired with a sense of
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the unknown. Such an author and such a text can only be known,
and always incompletely known, through a dialogical process . A
good scientist, like a good humanist, will learn to be a good reader
of signs and contexts.
Likewise, we must recognize that no dialogical perspective
in physics or social reality can be neutral. "Relativity, quantum
mechanics, [and] thermodynamics have shown us that nature
cannot be described 'from the outside,' as if by a spectator. " 47
Whatever theoretical map we construct will, as Feyerabend points
out, fall short of accurately describing reality . In Alfred Korzybski's
apt phrase, "the map is not the territory."
Still, that no map can ever encompass all the particulars of
the social or physical territory does not mean that the map may
be a free drawing . Social and physical reality must be treated as
real compositions by real and independent persons . They cannot
be completely known or mastered. If nature reveals herself to us
only partially and "only through the active construction in which
we participate," 48 so does history . Every attempt to contain either
one of them in a single rhetorical system obscures other valid
dimensions just as it does in the social world. 49
Because whatever" active, manipulating, and exploring" posture we adopt will both reveal and conceal reality, we can say
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle is but a microcosm of the
whole human perspective: the more we succumb to or adopt one
view, the more are other views closed to us. This leads us directly
back to notions of rhetoric in ancient thought and to the idea of
common sense as set out by Vico. Truth is made, not discovered;
and the concept of knowledge itself must be adjusted to account
for the verum ipsum factum. This theory certainly indicates that the
world is open-ended and without structure until man gives it
shape, but this shape cannot ever be completely remade at any
single instant or by any single individual or single culture. Whatever posture we adopt must reconcile itself with the past, tradition,
and nature itself.
Feyerabend suggests a method of "counter-induction"
as a
basis for a dialogue with nature. We must, he says, search out
the exceptions to the rules, must avoid making rules .50 We must,
in short, drop the demand that theory encompasses all the facts
because this inevitably leads to excluding the facts we do not like.
Instead, we should adopt a posture that leaves us open to facts
that do not fit. Moreover, we must recognize that
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the material that a scientist actuallyhas at his disposal, his laws, his
experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude towards the absurd consequences of
the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways,
ambiguous, and neverfully separatedfrom the historicalbackground.51

Such a course is not, of course, foolproof. It must be aware
of the dangers on both its flanks. On the one hand, there is the
danger of arbitrary and capricious reading; on the other, the temptation to relapse into soporific "logic." Modernity, with its belief
in the "true," should have protected us against the arbitrary, but
did not. Indeed, its very fascination with rules and the "true"
may have tended to push people into the capricious. Rhetoric is
certainly not immune to the capricious either-but at least it can
use both hands to struggle against it and is not restricted to defending itself with "logic."
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